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Abstract 
The growth in size, role and authority of private security has triggered a variety of regulatory 
reactions. These have stimulated a growing academic debate on  preferred regulatory models. This 
paper summarizes the key existing models of regulation. It then provides a critique of the 
observations of Loader and White (2017) on the existing models. It critically examines their 
proposed model and outlines how we believe that private security regulation can be enhanced by 
setting out ‘three pillars’ of effective regulation. The literature and research points towards the need 
for a regulatory pillar that enhances the wider private security sector, a distributive pillar that 
addresses security inequality, and lastly a responsibility pillar designed to align the private security 
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1. Introduction  
The growth in size, role and authority of private security in many countries has triggered a 
variety of regulatory reactions (de Waard, 1993; Button 2007a; CoESS, 2011, 2015; Button 2012; 
Button & Stiernstedt, 2016). These, in turn, have stimulated a growing academic debate on these 
reactions and the most appropriate design of regulatory models. A 2015 paper by Loader and White 
(2017) analysed existing models of regulation by identifying two, while suggesting a third. Grouping 
several ideas together (many stemming from the authors of this paper), the existing models are 
labelled by Loader and White as ’cleansing’ and ’communalizing’, with a new (third) model entitled 
‘civilizing’.  
 
Identifying the existing models and proposing a new model is a welcome addition to the growing 
literature on private security and regulation. Nevertheless, we argue that the deconstruction by 
Loader and White (2017) fails to capture both the sensitivities and comprehensiveness of the models 
they have critiqued, particularly when they are viewed together. There is, we posit, a need to paint 
a more nuanced picture, rather than to thrust the protagonists of regulatory change into distinct 
and narrow dichotomies. The model proposed by Loader and White, which they acknowledge is 
not the finished article, could be substantially expanded beyond the ‘skeleton’ framework offered.  
Indeed, it could be pushed in a slightly different direction – an idea that we will return to at the end 
of this paper.  
 
Consequently, to nurture constructive collaboration between those with vested interests in the 
overall advancement of private security regulation, this paper will summarize the arguments of 
Loader and White. The following three sections will; first, critique the division into three models, 
particularly the association of the authors of this paper with the ‘cleansing model’. Second, the paper 
will critique the ‘civilizing model’ that Loader and White propose. Third, the paper will seek to fuse 
some of these debates and ideas to create a new framework for the ‘civilizing’ model, which we 
refer to as the ‘three pillars’ model.  
 
 
2. Loader and White: a summary  
 
In 2017, Loader and White published a paper advocating what they refer to as a ‘civilizing’ model 
of regulation, where commodity and non-commodity values jostle and collide. They offered this 
model because it seeks to work with − rather than against − the market. In doing so they also 
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created a dichotomy between two other perspectives on regulation which they referred to as the 
‘cleansing’ model and ‘communal’ model.  
 
The rationale for yet another model for regulating private security arises out of Loader and 
White’s view that both previous models are simply predicated on the same neoclassical 
interpretation of how the market works. Under this perspective, changes are only made when flaws 
appear in what is otherwise understood as ‘good’ economic behaviour. Loader and Walker (2007) 
had previously examined critiques of this interpretation, which they reject for three reasons; one, 
that competition may drive a proliferation of budget services and technologies (which may erode 
the wellbeing and safety of citizens); two, that unequal buying power and subsequent market access 
fuels inequality and may result in security resources being distributed inversely in relation to risk 
(see also Hope & Sparks, 2000); and, three, that commodifying security into contextually tailor-made 
discrete ‘goods’ chips away at the trust and solidarity required to guarantee the equal protection of 
all members of society (Loader & Walker, 2007). Here, commodification means allowing private 
security to function in ways that previously were covered by the public sector (police), and are now 
paid for by consumers. They therefore surmise that, for those reasons, the market for private 
security stands in tension with the democratic promise of security – that all members of society 
merit equal consideration regarding their security needs.  
 
A summary of the three key perspectives (as they see them) is set out in Table 1 below. While 
there is an argument for commodification also having positive effects (see for example, Chang and 
Long, 2018) these results still involve an element of inequality, as purchasing power arguably remains 
at the forefront. Thus, this correlation between wealth and security must be regulated. The question 
is, how?  
 
Loader and White also seek to create a regulatory space where non-contractual public values 
and commitments of market and non-market actors can be expressed, deliberated upon, and (if 
appropriate) institutionalized. Introducing the ‘civilizing’ model, Loader and White do not attempt 
to rebuild the regulatory landscape, but rather they add two specific regulatory goals, namely 
‘inclusive deliberation’ and ‘social solidarity.’ By this they mean a regulatory structure that fosters 
connections between market transactions and members of the general community.  
 
Table 1. Models of regulating private security (Loader & White, 2017).  
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 Cleansing Model  Communalizing Model Civilising Model  
Regulatory goal  Consumer choice; product 
quality 




Assumptions     
Conception of market Neoclassical economic; 
amoral spaces of exchange 
Neoclassical economic; 
amoral spaces of exchange 
Economic sociology; moral 
spaces of exchange 
Conception of public 
interest 
Realized through market 
efficiency and enforcement 
of contractual relationships 
Realized through market 
efficiency and enforcement 
of contractual relationships 
Realized through public 
duty articulated outside of 
contractual relationships 
Analysis    
Problems with security 
market 
Low standards among 
sellers of security services 
and technologies; grudge 
purchasing 
Unequal purchasing power 
among buyers of security 
services and technologies; 
governance/ security 
deficits 
Social fragmentation in the 
democratic polity 
Solutions    
Regulatory targets Sellers Buyers Buyers and sellers 
Conception of 
regulatory space 
Centred Centred and de-centred Centred and de-centred 
Regulatory mechanisms Rules: licensing, standard- 
setting, codes of practice, 
monitoring 
Rules and principles: local 
budgets, participation 
Principles and rules: 
dialogue, delegation, and 
responsive regulation 
Relation to/ conception 
of democracy 
Background; representative Foreground; local, 
participative 
Foreground; deliberative 
Relation to status quo Conservative Critical and reformist Critical and reformist 
Key writers  Button (2007a), Prenzler 
and Sarre (2008) 
Johnston and Shearing 
(2003), Wood and Shearing 
(2007) 






3. Challenging Loader and White’s critique  
 
We submit that there are deficiencies in the  arguments of Loader and White. Let us begin by 
noting their primary observation: 
 
Upon surveying their body of work, it is immediately apparent that they [Button, Sarre, 
Prenzler] interpret the market for security and its relationship to the public interest through 
a textbook neoclassical economic lens. As long as buyers enter freely into the market and, 
following an informed appraisal of the services and technologies on offer, agree legally 
permissible terms and conditions with honorable sellers, no challenge to the public interest 
is generally seen to take place, regardless of whether or not the transaction erodes public 
values and commitments. Non-contractual moral concerns have no place in this model, 
either as a feature of market failure or as a motivator of human agency (Loader and White, 
2017 pp. 171-172) 
  
In particular, they offer the following critique of what they have called the ‘cleansing’ model, which 
they associate with us. They write:   
 
The cleansing model – which seeks to rid the market of deviant sellers in order to better 
serve the public interest – is the default position in the literature on private security 
regulation (p. 171).  
 
It is fair to say that there are many regulatory systems that would fit the cleansing model. These 
are those that are built upon a ‘light touch’ idea of regulation, and whose raison d’être is solely to 
remove ‘bad apples’ from the private security sector, or to prevent them from entering it in the first 
place. This is a perspective common in many jurisdictions in the USA and advocated for the UK in 
1996 (see Home Office, 1996; Hemmens et al, 2001; Bradley, 2016). However, this ‘minimalist’ 
position, as Button and George (2006) would describe it, is only part of the picture, and does not 
encapsulate our perspectives. Our work has sought to explain that regulation should do more than 
simply remove ‘bad apples’ from the security market. We seek to employ models that raise the 
standards of providers in nodes where they are used. We seek to improve the accountability of 
private security. We advocate to build into regulatory systems standards of training for operatives, 
codes of conduct, corporate compliance standards, and complaints procedures. We also emphasize 
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that the improvement of standards in private security can bring down crime, which is of benefit to 
all members of society, not just those persons who choose to employ security personnel.  
 
Moreover, one must factor in the public interest when considering the operation of private 
security staff. This idea is recognised in another article by Loader and White (2018) entitled ‘Valour 
for Money’. Here the issue of commodifying the security market is problematised, but no real 
solutions are offered, and regulation is referred to as “lines in the sand” (p. 1401). We argue, in 
contrast, that there is more to regulatory solutions than being just lines in the sand. An example is 
a guard failing to respond to an incident next to the space they protect. This is not automatically a 
negation of the public interest. The guard might not be properly trained to respond to such an 
incident, causing even more harm (clearly against the public interest) and endangering bystanders. 
Indeed, it might be a distraction to lure them from their post.  
 
Thus the debate cannot be conducted around the oft-used simplistic dichotomy: the public 
police only serve the public interest and private security sector only the private interest. There are 
many examples of the public police ignoring specific groups and failing to serve the public interest, 
such as denying the human rights of certain racial minorities.  Conversely, there are many examples 
of private security serving the public interest either through voluntary arrangements and statutory 
obligations, such as Project Griffin, Project Argus and third party policing (Mazerolle and Ransley, 
2006) (to which we will return later in this paper). Finally, there are many cases of public goods 
delivered by private companies (banking services, telecommunications, electricity etc.) under 
appropriate regulatory frameworks that are serving the public interest.   
 
Many of the arguments presented by Loader and White around public interest seem implicitly 
to focus upon residential security. They are concerned that initiatives such as gated communities 
(protected by private security) and the patrolling of public streets by private operatives challenge 
the public interest, and lead to greater security inequality. There is a body of evidence from South 
America, Africa and the USA where this is clearly observable (Blakely and Snyder, 1997; Huggins, 
2000). However, protecting residential enclaves is a very small portion of the private security 
sector workload. Clearly there is an issue of how best to integrate such security measures into a 
broader policing landscape. But the diversity of contexts in which private security operate needs 




Button (2008) has, for instance, sought to identify the means by which society is able to 
reduce security inequality by advocating expenditures for more deprived communities (via a tax 
on private security – thus the ‘security rich’ subsidize the security poor). This could be done by 
the development of ‘security unions’  that are modelled on ‘credit unions’5 which provide banking 
services, rather than security, to the public. Security unions would include many of the poorer 
sections of the community using a ‘mutuality’ model of delivery.  Sarre and Prenzler have also 
considered how to address security inequity.  In their report, Private security and public interest: 
Exploring private security trends and directions for reform in the new era of plural policing, they highlight 
the problem of the growing gap in security between rich and poor. Sarre and Prenzler note, in this 
context, that a great deal of situational prevention is done by the security industry. They cite van 
Dijk’s findings from the International Crime Victim Survey in relation to burglary prevention, that  
 
Across twelve Western nations the lowest income groups have stepped up their household 
security to a lesser extent than the middle and upper classes. They cannot afford to... the 
survey also shows that the lowest quartile has benefitted less from the falls in burglary 
victimization than the rest of the population (van Dijk, 2012, p. 17). 
 
With this phenomenon in mind, van Dijk has argued that ‘situational crime prevention is not just a 
matter of efficiency. It is also a matter of social justice’ (p. 17). Moreover, in response to the 
problem of inequalities in situationally-based protections from crime, Prenzler and Wilson (2014, 
p. 17) have argued that: 
 
The cost of security can entail significant disadvantage. However, governments can address 
the problem of capacity to pay through subsidized security; as well as security in government 
housing, public transport, public hospitals and public schools.  
 
Prenzler and Sarre (2014b) have also described a variety of security projects internationally 
that generated wide public interest benefits – including reduced victimization across a range of 
crimes, reduced financial and personal costs for potential offenders, reduced costs for taxpayers, 
and provided jobs for unemployed persons. More recently, Prenzler and Fardell (2016) reviewed a 
variety of domestic violence prevention programs involving private security operatives employing a 
range of preventative strategies. Many of these programs are operated by non-government 
                                                 




‘charity’-based organizations that rely on a mixture of private and government funding. Programs 
included the contracting in of private security firms to provide upgraded home security through 
‘target hardening’ of residences, and enhanced personal safety through mobile alarms (including 
pendant alarms and mobile phones). The more sophisticated programs involve a combination of 
private security monitoring and police priority rapid response. Effectiveness, according to the 
authors, appears to be closely related the operation of a ‘victim centred’ approach to assistance, 
including tailor-made security services. Success in security, they affirm, is premised on the private 
security firms being reputable operators, with their integrity and competency underwritten by 
government through an appropriate licensing system (see also Harkin & Fitz-Gibbon, 2016). 
 
Loader and White also describe the model they critique as ‘traditional state-centred 
command and control regulation’ (p. 172), ignoring the emphasis on democratic state control in 
the Button/Prenzler/Sarre model, including the idea of extending democratically-based regulation 
through a range of inputs from diverse stakeholders and clearly integrating them in the regulatory 
system without enabling them to ‘capture’ it (Button, 2008; Prenzler and Sarre, 2008). Designing 
regulation on three governing pillars (see below) in contrast maintains a democratic balance and in 
doing so addresses regulatory capture (see Meehan and Benson, 2015) which must be avoided.  
 
The ‘decentred’ model that White and Loader advocate purportedly draws on Ayres and 
Braithwaite’s (1992) concept of ‘responsive regulation’ and Gunningham and Grabosky’s (1989) 
concept of ‘smart regulation’ (White and Loader, 2017, p. 176). However, these are the two main 
sources for Prenzler and Sarre’s concept of ‘smart regulation’, which includes the following key 
criterion (2008, p. 274): 
 
Development and administration of [security industry] legislation should be consultative, with 
standing industry and stakeholder committees advising the regulatory agencies. This will 
attract industry support for compliance and make best use of insider expertise. It will also 
provide a source of continuous feedback about the impact of regulation. A spin-off would be 
a check on under-enforcement by institutionalizing regulatory tri-partism involving all 
stakeholders such as government and opposition politicians, unions, employers, academics 




Smart regulation applied to the security industry includes the idea of the regulator holding a 
mission for research and professional development that examines impact measures and public 
benefits (Prenzler & Sarre, 2008). 
 
 In terms of democratic criteria, many successful crime reduction projects involving the 
security industry have operated through partnerships, with steering committees involving a range 
of stakeholders. Membership usually includes representatives from diverse communities of interest 
– although these are often professionally-based, such as police and business groups. Prenzler and 
Sarre have, however, also argued that the crucial take-away message from critical evaluations of 
crime prevention partnerships is that they ‘need to be carefully managed, with a clear public 
interest benefit where public money is involved’ (Prenzler & Sarre, 2014b, p. 786). This includes 
consultation with affected communities and monitoring of impacts. Appropriate democratically-
oriented program management includes consultation and planning that also considers a range of 
risks to members of the public – including ‘intrusive surveillance or harassment and excessive 
force by security officers’ – with risks ‘reduced or eliminated through appropriate licensing 
systems, training and supervision, monitoring, codes of conduct and procedural rules’ (Prenzler & 
Sarre, 2014b, pp. 785-786). The ‘partnership’ model for optimizing the public benefits of private 
security therefore encourages input from a range of non-state actors consistent with the model 
advocated by White and Loader. At the same time, it needs to be emphasized that security 
partners need to be vetted to an acceptable level of professionalism through a proactive licensing 
regime operated by the democratic state, as this is beyond the scope of any program steering 
committee. Berg (2013) has also highlighted how local contractual arrangements can also facilitate 
strong governance.  
 
4. The ‘civilizing’ model  
 
We now turn to examine the key aspects of the Loader and White model and how these may be 
utilized in developing what we consider to be the ‘three pillars’ of regulation. We first look at their 
terms: ‘inclusive deliberation’ and ‘social solidarity.’ 
 
Inclusive deliberation 
‘Inclusive deliberation’ is defined by Loader and White as ‘the process of sustaining an open 
dialogue, in which all parties whose everyday lives are affected by the market for security are given 
the opportunity to explore how the market impacts upon their public values and commitments’ 
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(2015, p. 14). Their idea is two-fold. One, the public regulator delegates the responsibility for 
addressing security deficiencies to the institutions that have the appropriate reach, and, two, this 
process of delegation must be mediated through memoranda of understanding (MoUs). The terms 
of the MoUs should be agreed to by all institutions involved in a particular regulatory response.  
 
We maintain that there are already many examples of how deliberations take place to meet 
public demands through existing state governance structures and contractual structures (Sarre and 
Prenzler, 2011; Berg, 2013; Berg et al., 2014; and Berg and Shearing, 2015). Given that private 
security partly, and arguably primarily, is a commercial endeavour, and thus focused on sometimes 
narrow interests and profit, many companies bring together various players to form partnerships. 
This fosters effectiveness by resource and policy alignment as well as societal resilience by asset 
inter-operability. The former usually plays into the hands of the public interest and the latter, by its 
very definition, always does.  
 
We also believe that the focus upon trade associations as agents who can ‘translate the content 
of relevant MoUs into these hard and soft regulatory mechanisms in order to project the principles 
of inclusive deliberation and social solidarity to sellers on the ground’ (Loader and White, 2017, p. 
180), would have only limited success. As Loader and White rightly note, such bodies are influential 
(certainly the British Security Industry Association in the UK context) as they focus upon their 
members and generally national issues related to private security firms not nodal security 
arrangements. We believe that, moreover, for inclusive deliberation and social solidarity to work, it 
would need to address both national and nodal (local) levels. If the aim is to foster the public interest 
and reduce security inequity, at a national level the associations representing security managers 
would be equally if not even more important, as they buy private security, set the contractual 
standards and ultimately decide what the private security contractors should do (for a nodal context 
illustrating this see Button, 2007b). Therefore, focusing upon the UK, the Security Institute and the 
American Society for Industrial Security would be as equally important if not more important than 
the British Security Industry Association.  
 
The nodal level, whether residential areas, malls or leisure parks, would also need to develop 
such deliberations tailored to local needs and would necessitate agents important to influencing 
security within them.  These can be highly influential and effective through both state and private 
structures (see Berg 2013; Berg et al, 2014). For instance, imagine a shopping mall adjacent to a 
deprived housing estate with poor security. There might be times of the day where the security 
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force of the mall is under-utilized and some staff could be offered to patrol the adjacent estate to 
provide reassurance to that community. If there is an incident and the police require support, the 
mall offers private personnel – if the resources are there – to support the police. This would seem 
to be the type of arrangement Loader and White want, but the security managers (who control the 
security and who would need to convince their own managers) are the key to unlocking this.    
 
Finally, and moving on to the enforcement of regulation, there are also issues about the use of 
principles-based, non-binding and thus non-enforceable, contracts. Within the context of private 
security there are also included areas where a simple MoU will not suffice. An example is front line 
police-type services such as public patrols. Local and national level public-private-partnerships have 
already illustrated this sensitivity (Crawford, Lister, & Blackburn, 2005). The response to this by 
Loader and White is a reference to the responsive regulation enforcement pyramid (Ayres & 
Braithwaite, 1992). It may be, however, as Paas (1994, p. 353) argues,  ‘The use of an enforcement 
pyramid to elicit cooperation of regulated firms seem too complicated for practical use.’ 
Nonetheless, where cooperation is not forthcoming, despite threats and sanctions, the pyramid 
allows for licence revocation to stop errant security providers from operating and causing further 
harm.  
 
Social solidarity (in the public interest?)  
According to Loader and White (2017) the principle of ’social solidarity’ pertains to the process 
of fostering connections between market transactions and the responsibilities of the members of a 
particular political community. By closely attending iniquitous and damaging social behavior in the 
market, one finds ways of compensating those ‘injured’. Any regulator would then serve a dual 
purpose: preventing market failure, and acting as a motivator of human agency. 
 
Project Griffin – a program in London with specialist trained private security officers available 
to assist police in the event of an emergency such as terrorist attack – is probably the most notable 
of those examples, and, although not without critique and room for improvement, it is easy to see 
its current and potential benefits to society (Sarre and Prenzler, 2011). The extensive statutory 
health and safety provisions which exist in the UK and EU also provide another example of how a 
public good ‘health and safety’ can be delivered by public and private actors through mandatory 
minimum standards of safety. In the UK, ‘it is an employer's duty to protect the health, safety and 
welfare of their employees and other people who might be affected by their business. Employers 
must do whatever is reasonably practicable to achieve this’ (Health and Safety Executive, n.d.). Such 
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provisions already cover security-related issues which might cause physical harm. So, for instance, if 
security operatives were guarding a venue such as a stadium that was already over-filled, the 
operatives, because of their health and safety responsibilities, would have a duty to intervene beyond 
their private space to stop more fans arriving and entering the venue. 
 
Nevertheless, Loader and White are correct to raise the need for better legal mechanisms to 
enable and obligate private security to support the state in certain situations. Some countries already 
do so. In Spain for example there is an obligation to support the state in an emergency (Gimenez-
Salinas, 2004). In Sweden, especially trained security guards can act as ‘law enforcement stewards’ 
under law 1980:580 §6 which states that:  
 
‘A law enforcement steward is subordinated a police officer. He or she is obliged to obey 
an order announced by a policeman in duty, unless it is obvious that the order does not concern 
the service as a law enforcement steward or that it is contrary to law or other constitution’.6 
 
It is therefore possible to de-commodify in an instant parts of private security powers to serve in 
the interest of the public. It is also under consideration and development to extend this type of de-
commodification even further in the case of major incidents such as terrorist attacks, etc.  
   
The notion that commodification of security may be perilous is not new. Loader co-authored a 
book in 2007 making a case for commodifying – i.e. turning security into discrete goods tailored to 
individual, community and organizational preferences – having a negative influence on trust and 
solidarity as requirements for guaranteeing equal protection of all members of society (Loader & 
Walker, 2007). There are, however, at least three problems with this. One: society is made from 
discrete elements. These elements, whatever they may be – people, processes, technology, etc., –
are nevertheless inexorably interrelated and consequently form various threads in society. Threads 
themselves are interrelated, with other more or less similar strands. Cohesion, equality and security 
are conditioned by how fine the resulting fabric is woven. Two: individual, community and 
organizational preferences should not be confused with individual, community and organizational 
needs (actual or legally required) that may or may not be the same. In short, objective needs and 
subjective wants are not necessarily the same. Three: arguing for a minimal standard level of 
protection for all members of society is an easy case to make, but for all individuals to have exactly 
the same security is simply impossible. Solidarity (in terms of security) is fostered by making sure 
                                                 
6 As translated.  
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that no-one is left behind. We should strive to grant a minimal level of protection rather than to 
push at the top and wait for a trickle-down effect. Comprehensive regulation means simply not 
turning a blind eye to the potential pitfalls of letting the market run amok without regard for the 
public good. In that regard, it should be noted that before the private security industry was regulated 
in England and Wales in 2001 there were regular problems exposed of criminal infiltration in the 
industry, low standards of training (and in some cases no training) and incompetence (Button, 2007b; 
Button, 2012).  
 
5. A less vague and utopian future model: the three pillars model 
 
The above factors, we argue, drive the case for an enhanced and unified response to private 
security regulation, and they persist in the recognition of the powers vested in security providers, 
the scandals linked to misconduct, poor standards and abuse of power  (Prenzler & Sarre, 2008; 
Sarre & Prenzler, 2009, see also Pashley & Cools, 2012). Available instruments for governance 
through civil and criminal law, market forces and self-regulation are more or less beneficial, but all 
fall short of providing a comprehensive regulatory framework. Nor are either of the instruments 
considered superfluous, but the case for a comprehensive model of regulation to be built upon three 
pillars is compelling. Given the intricacies of the contemporary private security industry, and the 
degree to which it is interwoven with public ambitions, a more complex (but not complicated) form 
of regulation is called for, one that intervenes at all stages of activity – planning, acting and output, 
where output includes both private and social goods. It is, however, important to note that whatever 
weight is afforded to the criticism of the alleged emphasis in the three pillars modelon a market 
driven neo-classical approach to regulation, it more resembles a management-based form of 
regulation. The three pillars model does not specify the technologies used, nor does it prescribe 
specific outputs in terms of social goals (cf. Coglianese & Lazer, 2003). Rather the task is to create 
a model of regulation within a new framework, one that is capable of adapting to an ever-changing 
environment and contemporary challenges by dynamically matching interventions to risk.  
 
The central idea is that the model of regulation (delivering quality and equitable security) is built 
upon three separate but linked pillars, fusing the ideas of all three regulatory ‘schools.’ The pillars 
are described as ‘regulatory,’ ‘distributive’ and ‘responsible.’ We do not advocate for one body 
necessarily being responsible for all three; it could be a mixture. We do not offer a detailed outline 
of these pillars, rather the general principles. Some of our other work covers in much more depth 
the structures which can be built upon these foundations (See Button, 2008; Prenzler and Sarre, 
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2008). It should also be noted that the pillars will most likely be activated in differing proportions in 
different jurisdictions depending on community needs. 
 
The regulatory pillar 
First, there is the regulation of the private security sector which should be ‘enhancing.’ It should 
not only ‘cleanse’ the industry of ‘bad apples’, but also improve standards and apply to the wider 
private security sector (Button, 2012). This should also provide the foundations for higher non-
compulsory standards (Button, 2007a; Prenzler and Sarre, 2008). Thus, the regulator should focus 
on raising standards while largely (but not completely) leaving the formation of partnerships to be 
managed primarily at a local level. Here regulation not only serves the public interest but also 
indirectly encourages partnerships by raising private security above the ‘junior-partner’ position 
through enhanced integrity and competency (Button, 2012; Shearing & Stenning, 1981). 
 
The distributive pillar 
Second, there need to be equitable opportunities to access security and address security 
inequality. There are  ways to deal with it, for example through monies being transferred to less 
secure communities to purchase and enhance their own security, according to their needs. This can 
be seen in Zwlethemba and Toronto, for example (Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Rigakos, 2002). In 
the latter communities who had been largely abandoned by the Toronto police were able to 
purchase the security of Intelligarde who were able to significantly enhance the security of these 
housing estates (Rigakos, 2002). Consultation provides another means. For example, the security-
focused Travel Safe Program that generated major improvements in commuter safety in the 
Australian state of Victoria in the 1990s was designed with extensive stakeholder input including 
through community consultative forums (Carr & Spring, 1993). The more demanding task is to find 
the means to secure the funding to launch such initiatives. Also, the unequal buying power, pushing 
a distribution of security inverse to risk (Hope, 2000) is only a problem if the lowest level of security 
does not meet the standards of the least needy. There are many ways this could be achieved. The 
essence of this pillaris that communities with less security should be provided with resources to 
enhance it.  
 
The responsibility pillar 
Third, there are structures and responsibilities that can also be used to align the private security 
industry with public interest, for example, legal responsibilities that support the public sector in the 
event of a crime emergency. This currently happens in Spain and Sweden (Gimenez-Salinas, 2004). 
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Where in Sweden, a police officer can immediately deputise any private security steward 
(ordningsvakt) to aid and support the police. The Private security steward is by law bound to comply 
with the police and prioritise public interests responsibilities.The related issue of health and safety 
– which also cuts across security – is already established in the EU and many other countries as a 
legal requirement. All organizations, whether public, private or voluntary, are obliged to meet a 





We recognize the significant contribution of Loader and White to developing ideas for more 
effective governance and regulation of private security personnel and the contribution of private 
security to enhancing the common weal. The regulation of private security is a challenging concept, 
and those pushing for improvement through change should be commended for doing so. For the 
improvements to be as effective as possible it is important to keep an open mind to the protagonists 
of change and avoid overly dichotomizing their voices. The article by Loader and White treads 
dangerously close to being guilty of the latter.  
 
As our response has shown, the classification and description of the schools of regulatory 
agendas does have its caveats. At the same time, many of the fundamental ideas suggested by Loader 
and White (2017) are embraced here. Some of them are incorporated in our proposed ‘three pillars’ 
model of private security regulation. The literature and research points towards the need for a new 
regulatory framework. We argue for three pillars: a regulatory pillar that enhances the wider private 
security sector, a distributive pillar that addresses security inequality, and, lastly, a responsibility 
pillar designed to align the private security industry with public interests. It is our hope that the 
introduction of such a model into the marketplace of ideas will nurture further constructive 
collaboration between all of those engaged in this topic, one where an effective regulatory 
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